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LABOR LAw - UsE OF FEDERAL REMOVAL JuRISDICTION TO
DEFEAT STATE CouRT INJUNCTION Surrs-The use of the injunction in labor disputes is by no means a thing of the past. Although
equitable relief against union activities is no longer generally available
in the federal courts, such relief may often be obtained by application
to the courts of the states. In response to state court injunction suits
involving parties subject to the National Labor Relations Act,1 astute
union counsel have fairly recently adopted an approach which has thus
far achieved some degree of success. This new strategy is simply to
remove the case to the appropriate federal district court, where, it is
anticipated, the limitations on federal equity jurisdiction contained in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act2 will normally lead the court to vacate any
temporary restraining order which may have been issued by the state
court, and then to dismiss the action. The success of this maneuver
hinges almost entirely on a procedural question-is the case properly
removable? But before attempting to analyze this procedural problem
it is necessary to give some consideration to the basic substantive law
involved.

I. Substantive Principles
The instances are few in which federal law grants to a private party
the right to secure injunctive relief in a labor dispute. The original
NLM was interpreted as creating only public rights and as conferring
upon the National Labor Relations Board exclusive primary authority
to remedy unfair labor practices by an employer.3 That the Labor-

149 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. (1946) §§151-166, as amended.
247 Stat. L. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1946) §§101-115.
SAznalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 60 S.Ct.
561 (1940).
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Management Relations Act4 did not change this situation except as it
expressly provided for private remedies is :6.rmly established.5 At present private injunctive relief is authorized by the LMRA only (1) to
restrain payments to employee representatives in violation of the terms
of the act,6 and (2) to enjoin breaches of collective agreements.7 Furthermore, not only do these statutes fail to provide any general private
right to equitable relief, but by force of the restrictions contained in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act federal courts are, with a few exceptions,
unable to grant injunctions even to enforce rights accruing under state
law.
By necessity, therefore, employers have turned to state law as enforced in state courts. Here the main problem is the extent to which
state authority over labor controversies in industries affecting interstate
commerce has been superseded by the federal labor relations legislation. 8 Supreme Court decisions suggest that in general the states have
no power to regulate activities which are either made unfair labor
practices by the NLRA9 or are "protected" by that statute.10 However,
a few state courts have indicated their disagreement with this interpretation of the Supreme Court's position by claiming concurrent jurisdiction over unfair labor practices in some situations.11 The law with
respect to conduct which is neither federally prohibited nor "protected"
is far from settled.12 Adding to the uncertainty in this whole area is
the sharp disagreement that exists as to the classi:6.cation of certain types
61 Stat. L. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §§141-197.
Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, ( 4th Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d)
183; Amalgamated Assn. v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., (8th Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 902.
o 61 Stat. L. 158, §302(e) (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l86(e).
7 The weight of authority supports the existence of this remedy. Milk and Ice Cream
Drivers Union v. Gillespie Milk Products Corp., (6th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 650. But
where the requirements of the Norris Act have not been satisfied no injunction may be
issued. Alcoa Steamship Co. v. McMahon, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 81 F. Supp. 541, alfd. (2d
Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 567, cert. den. 338 U.S. 821, 70 S.Ct. 65 (1949).
8 See Smith, "The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations," 46
MICH. L. REv. 593 (1948); Cox and Seidman, "Federalism and Labor Relations," 64
HAnv. L. REv. 211 (1950). Another but now less important problem concerns the status
of picketing as a constitutionally protected form of free speech. See 51 MxcH. L. REv.
1217 (1953).
9 Gamer v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953); Plankinton Packing
Co. v. WERB, 338 U.S. 953, 70 S.Ct. 491 (1950).
10 Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v.
WERB, 340 U.S. 383, 71 S.Ct. 359 (1951).
11 Montgomery Bldg. & Construction Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 256
Ala. 678, 57 S. (2d) 112 (1951), reh. den. 256 Ala. 689, 57 S. (2d) 121 (1951), cert.
granted 343 U.S. 962, 72 S.Ct. 1061 (1952), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 344
U.S. 178, 73 S.Ct. 196 (1952); State ex rel. Tidewater-Shaver Barge Lines v. Dobson, 195
Ore. 533, 245 P. (2d) 903 (1952); Winkelman Bros. Apparel, Inc. v. Intl. Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 22 CCH Lab. Cas. 1!67,262 (1952).
12 See 53 CoL. L. REv. 258 (1953).
4

5 Amazon
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of collective action as prohibited, "protected," or neither.13 The effect
of this confusion is that in many cases the trial judge will exercise a
broad initial discretion in passing upon the validity of the preemption
defense. Consequently, it would not be surprising to find union defendants eager to effect removal of injunction suits to the federal courts,
where defenses based upon the exclusiveness of the NLRB's authority
are likely to command maximum respect. And when account is taken
of the limited equity powers of federal courts the question of removability clearly assumes decisive importance.

II. Procedural Problems
In general, only those actions "of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction ..."14 may be removed from
the state courts. In determining whether federal courts have original
jurisdiction over actions for equitable relief against union conduct, three
principal problems are involved: (I) Do such suits, when intended by
plaintiff to rest upon state law, nevertheless present a claim under a
law of the United States so as to confer federal jurisdiction? (2) Do
district courts lack "original jurisdiction" over such suits because the
Taft-Hartley Act vests primary authority over unfair labor practices in ,
the NLRB? (3) Do the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act have
the effect of withdrawing federal jurisdiction? At the outset it may be
said that the majority of the district courts which have passed upon
these questions have denied removal on all three grounds.15 However,
only a relatively small number of courts have thus far had occasion to
consider this matter, and the minority's position has recently received
considerable support from a decision by the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit.16
In treating the first of the three problems, the courts have denied
federal jurisdiction where plaintiff's complaint is so drawn as to rely
solely upon state law even though facts are alleged which might entitle
plaintiff to relief under federal law as well.17 The theory here is th~t
13 E.g., stranger picketing. See 20 Umv. Cm. L. REv.
14 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1441(a).
15 For cases denying removal see Richman Brothers Co.

109 (1952).

v. Clothing Workers, (D.C.
Ohio 1953) 114 F. Supp. 185; Castle & Cooke Terminals v. Longshoremen's Union, (D.C.
Hawaii 1953) 110 F. Supp. 247; Berrios v. Bull Insular Lines, Inc., (D.C. P.R. 1953)
109 F. Supp. 858; and cases cited in notes 17 and 23 infra.
16 Direct Transit Lines v. Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, (6th Cir. 1952) 199 F.
(2d) 89. For other cases allowing removal see Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Grand Rapids
Bldg. Trades Council, 22 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r67,071 (1952), and cases cited in notes 20, 24,
and 28 infra.
11 Hat Corp. of America v. United Hatters Union, 24 CCH Lab. Cas. 1167,861
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no claim "arising under"18 a federal statute is presented, because "the
party who brings the suit is master to decide what law he will rely
upon."19 Since counsel for employer-plaintiffs have recognized the
importance of resting their claims entirely on state law, this view in
itself would be sufficient to defeat removal in most cases in this area.
To meet this objection one court allowing removal has contended that
"the Court may properly take judicial notice of any Federal laws necessarily brought into play by the allegations of the complaint, although
specific reference to such laws has been omitted,"20 and since, due to
preemption, plaintiff actually has no state cause of action, federal law
is "necessarily brought into play" by the complaint.21 This argument
is somewhat weakened where, as is almost invariably true in these cases,
plaintiff in fact has no private federal cause of action either; in this
situation the minority's view comes close to an assertion that federal
jurisdiction may be based upon the existence of a federal defense. But
on the whole, removal problems involving a claim assertable under both
federal and state law have heretofore arisen so infrequently that there
seems to be neither authority nor any established principle of federal
question jurisdiction which points inevitably to one solution or the
other.22 In apparent recognition of this fact the courts declining jurisdiction seem anxious to justify their action on other grounds as well.
The reason most frequently advanced for not allowing removal is
that since the NLRA confers exclusive original "jurisdiction" on the
NLRB to remedy unfair labor practices, federal. courts are without
original jurisdiction to entertain suits involving such conduct.23 Courts
(1953); Wright and Morrissey, Inc. v. Local 522, Intl. Hod Carriers Union, (D.C. Vt.
1952) 106 F. Supp. 138; Associated Telephone Co. v. Communication Workers, (D.C.
Cal. 1953) 114 F. Supp. 334.
1s28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1337.
19 Associated Telephone Co. v: Communication Workers, (D.C. Cal. 1953) 114 F.
Supp. 334 at 336.
20 S. E. Overton Co. v. Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 24 CCH Lab Cas. ,J67,803 at
p. 84,358 (1953). In this case the court also employed judicial notice to determine that
interstate commerce was involved. For a different approach to the commerce problem see
Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 278.
21 It seems quite doubtful that removal would be permitted in any case in which the
court did not feel that preemption had occurred.
22 Justice Holmes' statement in The Fair v. Kohler Die and Specialty Co., 228 U.S.
22, 33 S.Ct. 410 (1913), that plaintiff is master to determine what law he will rely upon
was made with reference to an attempt by defendant to defeat federal jurisdiction; as
applied to the converse situation it is at best pure dictum. On the other hand, the decision
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Stewart, 245 U.S. 359, 38 S.Ct. 130 (1917), lends some support
to the minority's position, but there too a somewhat different problem was involved.
23 Walker v. United Mine Workers, (D.C. Pa. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 608; Dynamic
Mfrs., Inc. v. Local 614, General Drivers of America, (D.C. Mich. 1952) 103 F. Supp.
651; Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co. v. Berthiaume, (D.C. S.C. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 451.
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allowing removal readily admit the exclusiveness of the NLRB's "jmisdiction," but contend that their jurisdiction may be predicated on the
assertion of a claim under a federal statute even though the court
ultimately is unable to grant plaintiff any relief. 24 This argument is
supported by the well-established doctrine that even a non-meritorious
claim under a federal law is sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction
provided it presents a question of some substance.25 However, the
applicability of this doctrine would be rather questionable if the NLRA
were interpreted as depriving the district courts of basic jurisdiction
over the type of suit here involved. 26 So perhaps the real reason for the
minority's position is the feeling that the sections of the NLRA purporting to vest paramount original authority over unfair labor practices
in the NLRB 27 were intended merely to prescribe a rule of noninterference by the courts and not to operate as a limitation on their
jurisdiction in the strict sense of the term. 28 In this connection it could
be argued that a "non-jurisdictional" interpretation of the NLRA,
insofar as it tends to defeat state court suits involving unfair labor
practices, has the desirable effect of carrying out Congress' policy of
granting exclusive original authority over unfair labor practices to the
NLRB. Decisions of the Supreme Court:2 9 and of several courts of
appeal30 dismissing· private suits on the basis of the NLRB's exclusive
"jurisdiction" furnish some support for the majority's view. However,
these cases do not appear to be absolutely conclusive with respect to
the present question, since the courts were not called upon to draw a
24 S. E. Overton Co. v. Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 24 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r67,803
(1953); Pocahontas Corp. v. Bldg. Trades Council, (D.C. Me. 1950) 93 F. Supp. 217.
25 See The Fair v. Kohler Die and Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 33 S.Ct. 410 (1913);
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773 (1946). It could be argued that the problem
raised by a claim for injunctive relief under the NLRA is not sufficiently substantial to
constitute a federal question. See 52 MxcH. L. R:sv. 157 (1953).
26 I.e., as effecting an implied repeal pro tanto of 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1337.
For cases in which the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide the question of implied
repeal in co~ection with review of NLRB rulings in representation cases see NLRB v.
!BEW, 308 U.S. 413, 60 S.Ct. 306 (1940), and Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis,
325 U.S. 697, 65 S.Ct. 1316 (1945).
27 The most important section in this respect is 61 Stat. L. 146, §lO(a) (1947), 29
U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l60(a), which provides "The Board is empowered •.• to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice. • • • This power shall not
be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, law, or otherwise••.•"
28 This was apparently the theory employed in upholding jurisdiction in Reavis v.
!BEW, (D.C. Tex. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 542.
29 E.g., Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 60
S.Ct. 561 (1940).
ao Volney Felt Mills, Inc. v. LeBus, (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 497; California
Assn. of Employers v. Bldg. Trades Council, (9th Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d) 175; Amazon
Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, (4th Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 183.
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sharp distinction between dismissal for want of jurisdiction and dismissal for lack of a meritorious claim. Thus this issue, no less than the
:first problem, is a relatively novel one and can be decided either way
without much difficulty.
The :final problem as to original jurisdiction concerns the effect of
the Norris Act. Here the :first inquiry is whether that statute relates to
"jurisdiction" in the basic sense, or merely to "equity jurisdiction."31
Since in United States 11. United Mine W orkers32 the Supreme Court
apparently assumed that the limitations of the Norris Act were truly
jurisdictional, it seems that this question must at least tentatively be
decided in favor of the courts which deny removal. But in response
the minority allowing removal again advance the argument that federal
original jurisdiction is not dependent upon the court's ability to grant
the relief requested. 33 Thus the crucial issue appears to be one upon
which there is no real authority: assuming that the Norris Act applies
to true jurisdiction, does it simply limit jurisdiction to issue the injunctions which it prohibits, or does it go further and withdraw jurisdiction
even to entertain suits for such injunctions? The difficulty, if not
impossibility, in reaching a completely satisfactory solution to this question as a matter of legal theory is emphasized by the fact that no less an
authority on equity jurisprudence than Professor Chafee, disagreeing
completely with the Supreme Court's assumption in the United Mine
Workers case, presents a very strong argument that logically the Norris
Act should not be interpreted as affecting true jurisdiction at all. 34 So
here too, just as is true of the other procedural issues, the state of the
law may be described as far from settled. For this reason and in view
of the important social consequences B.owing from any decision as to
the permissible scope of union activities it seems reasonable to suppose
that policy factors may have a very significant bearing on the results
reached in these cases.

III. Policy Considerations
The dispute over removability represents but one aspect of the
whole problem of the proper role to be played by the states in the :field
of labor relations. Obviously there is little justification for an assertion
31 That "equity jurisdiction" is
PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, c. 8 (1950).

not true jurisdiction is pointed out in

CHAFEE,

SoMl!

a2 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677 (1947).

Direct Transit Lines, Inc. v. Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 22 CCH Lab. Cas.
,I67,072 (1952), mandamus den. (6th Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 89; Pocahontas Corp. v.
Bldg. Trades Council, (D.C. Me. 1950) 93 F. Supp. 217.
34 CHAFEE, SoMl! PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, c. 9 (1950). To the same effect see Cox,
"The Void Order and the Duty to Obey," 16 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 86 (1948).
33
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of federal jurisdiction if the state laws relied upon by plaintiff have not
been superseded; removal in this situation would in practical effect
accomplish by judicial :6at an extension of the Norris Act's limitations
to suits in state as well as federal courts. But where preemption has
occurred and a state court nevertheless grants injunctive relief the case
for allowing removal is strong. In view of the frequently crippling
effect of those labor injunctions· which are found on appeal to have
been issued erroneously,36 the normal procedure for vindication of a
federal defense, viz., appeal to the highest state court followed by
application to the Supreme Court for review, is highly inadequate from
the union's standpoint in injunction suits. In fact, it seems that in such
cases removal constitutes the only practicable method for ensuring to
union defendants their full rights under federal law.36 Here the difficulty stems, of course, from the doctrine that removal jurisdiction cannot be based upon the existence of a federal question raised in the
answer. 37 Whether according complete protection to union defendants
justifies what could perhaps be considered a circumvention of this
doctrine through some slight stretching of established legal principles
relating to original jurisdiction is a matter of opinion. It need only be
said here that since any non-recognition of federal rights by the state
courts is doubtless due to the confused state of the law3 8 rather than to
a deliberate attempt to B.out national policy, the number of occasions
calling for removal will probably diminish as time passes and Supreme
Court decisions or subsequent legislation tends to clarify the dividing
line between federal and state authority. But in the meantime the fact
that even a few federal courts have been willing to take jurisdiction,
when coupled with the decisive practical effect of such a holding,
makes it clear that any union counsel faced with a state court injunction
suit who fails to attempt removal is overlooking one of his best possible
defenses.
George B. Berridge, S.Ed.
85 See FRANXPURTER AND GRBENB, THB LAlloR lNJUNcnoN 224 (1930).
36 In Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, (9th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 848, the court at
the request of the NLRB enjoined an employer from enforcing a state court injunction
against picketing. Query as to the correctness of this decision in view of 28 U.S.C. (Supp.
V, 1952) §2283, which in general prohibits federal courts from enjoining proceedings in
state courts.
37 For a criticism of this doctrine see Fraser, "Some Problems in Federal Question
Jurisdiction," 49 MicH. L. REv. 73 (1950); but cf. Bergman, "Reappraisal of Federal
Question Jurisdiction," 46 MICH. L. REv. 17 (1947).
ss See, e.g., comment in 27 N.Y. Umv. L. REv. 468 (1952), contending that federal
law should not be held to have affected common law remedies against union action. Cf.
the subsequent decision in Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953).

